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1
Vietnam has been carrying out an ambitious reform program since 1987, including
decollectivisation of agriculture, complete price liberalisation, introduction of a flexible
exchange rate system and significant liberalisation of foreign trade and foreign direct
investment (FDI). Despite the lack of international financial support before 1994, the
country achieved some notable successes (Dollar, 1994): from 1989 to 1993 Vietnam's
GDP grew by 7 per cent on an annual average, and at the same time inflation was
brought down from three-digit rates in 1986-1988 to about 10 per cent in 1992 and
1993. This was accompanied by significant structural changes of the Vietnamese
economy in response to-large shifts in relative prices (Diehl, 1994). The growth of
agricultural production since the early eighties and above all the expansion of the
previously suppressed service sector since 1989 cushioned the consequences of the
temporary decline of industrial output. In the same vein, mass lay-offs from both state-
owned and private manufacturing enterprises were largely absorbed by other sectors.
Significant structural changes occurred also within the manufacturing sector, both
across industries and ownership forms (Diehl, 1994). For example, production of
foodstuff, clothing, footwear and electrical products expanded, whereas machinery and
other metal products declined significantly. This structural change by and large fits into
the pattern that one would have expected for a labour abundant country like Vietnam
that promoted capital-intensive industries in the pre-reform era. What is puzzling at first
sight, however, is that after a relatively moderate recession the output of state-owned
enterprises (SOE) in the manufacturing sector was growing at high rates, even faster
than that of the private sector, contrasting to the development in Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE). It has to be assessed whether this development can be attributed to the
speed and design of economic reforms or only to different pre-reform conditions. This
question has been discussed with respect to China (cf. Raiser 1995 for an overview),
but the main arguments of this debate are expected to hold for the case of Vietnam, too.
Hence, the central question of this paper is how industrial SOE in Vietnam adjusted to
the changes economic environment and, in particular, whether they still enjoy privileged
treatment from the government. One hypothesis is that government intervention in
This paper was written as part of the project "Real adjustment in the economic transformation process of
Vietnam". Financial support from the Volkswagen Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. Thanks are due to the
staff of Vien Quan l_y Kinh T§ (Central Institute for Economic Management) in Hanoi for organizing the interviews
and distributing the questionnaires, to Javier Revilla Diez for providing his 1992 interview notes, and to Rolf J.
Langhammer and Martin Raiser for helpful comments.Vietnam in favour of industrial SOE remained high, although less visible than under the
old central planning regime. If this is true, transformation was not as complete as it
seemed to be, and real adjustment of SOE has only been delayed. The
counterhypothesis would be that industrial SOE indeed faced harder budget constraints,
but that they simply enjoyed favourable initial conditions due to the previous
government support and thus could adjust very fast to changing economic conditions in
spite of privileges withdrawn. If this is true, private enterprises are already at level
playing field with SOE, but temporarily SOE are doing better as long as these conditions
have not yet been depreciated. Moreover, since there has been virtually no privatisation
the question arises how the enterprise restructuring in the industrial sector actually was
conducted. SOE may have reacted actively to market signals, or they may have waited
for government directives, even after budget constraints were tightened. Since
published statistical information does not help to test these conflicting hypotheses it is
necessary to use survey data, either from standardised questionnaires or from case
studies. Similar studies have been conducted in China (Byrd, 1992) and Poland (Estrin
etal., 1993; Pinto etal., 1993).
The case study approach attempts to gain an understanding of the administrative
environment for SOE and of unquantifiable aspects of enterprise management. Direct
observation may allow more confident judgements about causes and patterns of firm
level adjustment than could be inferred from industrial statistics. Moreover, case studies
allow to track the actual implementation of state enterprise reforms which often differ
greatly from government blueprints and from press reports. Although it is always difficult
to draw general conclusions from case studies due to the limited representativeness, it
can be useful to depict real-life situations as a means to generate additional
hypotheses. However, knowledge of general characteristics of the industries concerned
and overall trends must be used to complement interview data.
The following section gives an overview over economic policy measures in Vietnam and
discusses the role of pre-reform characteristics for the different economic performance
of Asian and Central and Eastern European countries. Moreover, the development of
the manufacturing industry since 1988 is summarised on an disaggregate level. It is
shown that the relative success of SOE has been caused by the general collapse of
cooperatives on the one hand and the large success of some SOE dominated industries
on the other hand. The third section reviews the findings from previous enterprise
studies and presents stylised facts from own interviews with managers and government
officials in October 1994. It is argued that the budget constraints have been hardenedsignificantly, especially since 1991. The role of market signals versus government
directives for the adjustment of industrial SOE is analysed in more detail in case studies
presented in the fourth section. The last section summarises the evidence.
2. Reforms and real adjustment of manufacturing SOE: the aggregate
perspective ^
Manufacturing SOE are affected by almost every reform measure in the ongoing
economic transformation process, not only by specific ones, e.g. privatisation programs.
Hence, a brief overview of pre-reform conditions and general reform measures in
Vietnam provides the necessary background information for the evaluation of more
specific measures for the reorganisation of SOE.
2.1 The role of initial conditions
The previously centrally planned economies in Europe and Asia shared many,
similarities concerning the challenges to be faced in the transformation process.
However., in the pre-reform era, they were quite distinct in three major economic
characteristics (Rana and Paz, 1994). The first difference relates to the
comprehensiveness of central planning. The state enterprise sector was much smaller
in Vietnam than in CEE. In 1980, more than 40 per cent of the manufactured output
2 in
Vietnam had already been produced by non-state enterprises (handicraft cooperatives
3
and private enterprises), mostly small-scale firms, which employed about 70 per cent of
manufacturing labour (Table 1). During the eighties, non-state sector output grew faster
than that of SOE leading to a rising share of the non-state sector. By contrast, the
respective shares were only about 10 per cent in CEE (Raiser, 1995). .
In some industries where small scale firms dominated (other metal products, wood pro-
ducts, glassware and pottery) non-state enterprises produced even more than SOE
(Table A1). Moreover, regional administrations (people's committees on province level)
were given greater autonomy in Vietnam than in CEE. In principle, economic
management in Vietnam was also coordinated in a hierarchical way through interlocking
plans, but in practice the material allocation system was much less extensive than in
2 Except when stated otherwise, electricity generation and crude oil production, which are always included in
Vietnamese industrial statistics, are excluded from the following analysis.
3 In the eighties, cooperatives were not regulated as comprehensively as SOE although they enjoyed some state
benefits. Moreover, since 1989 they are treated like private enterprises. Hence, cooperatives should not be
lumped together with SOE.CEE and left room for local governments' activities. Even in the eighties, when the five
year, economic plans and supplementary short-term directives were still binding,
economic activities beyond the official plan had been admitted in Vietnam (Vo Nhan Tri,
1990).
Table 1 - Manufacturing
8 output and employment in Vietnam by ownership, 1980-89
Ownership type
State-owned enterprises
(share in per cent)
Non-state sector'
3
(share in per cent)
Total manufacturing
3
Gross output (billion Dong, in















^Total industry excl. electricity and mining. - ^Cooperatives and private enterprises.
Source: General Statistical Office (1992c); own calculations.
A second difference is the much greater importance of agriculture-based and labour-
intensive industries in Vietnam compared to CEE. Food processing,
4 and production of
textiles, clothing and leather products have traditionally been the largest industries of
Vietnam's manufacturing industry, accounting for 50 per cent of manufacturing value
added
5 and 52 per cent of manufacturing employment in 1989 (Table 2). By contrast,
SOE dominated heavy industries (metallurgy and manufacturing of chemical products
and construction materials) which accounted for only 17 per cent of value added and
employment. This contributed to the greater flexibility of the economy since the amount
of sector-specific physical capital threatened by obsoleteness in the reform process was
relatively small. • •
4... Note that food processing is capital intensive only in SOE, indicated by the high labour productivity.
5 Disaggregated value added data are only available from the 1989 input-output table for Vietnam, compiled by a
team from the UN Statistical Office and based on the System of National Accounts (GSO, 1992a).Table 2 - Manufacturing









































































aTotal industry excl. electricity and mining. - ''Electrical products, machinery, other metal products.
Source: General Statistical Office (1992a, 1994b); own calculations.
The third difference relates to the importance of CMEA trade. Although Vietnam was
affected by the cessation of CMEA trade and finance agreements it was much less
integrated in the CMEA wide specialisation than the industrialised countries of CEE. In
addition, Vietnam is adjacent to the fastest growing region in the world economy and
was able to follow the export orientation of its neighbours. Vietnamese exports more
than-trebled from 1987 to 1993, mainly due to the expansion of agricultural raw
materials and crude oil.
6 Hence, import volumes could be sustained in spite of the
cessation of CMEA aid in 1990, which had been in the order of 10 per cent of GDP in
the eighties, and in spite of lacking access to western capital markets.
In summary, the initial conditions in Vietnam were widely different from those of the
former centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe. Such conditions give rise to the
hypothesis that the industrial sector in general and especially non-state enterprises
were able to adapt relatively fast to the changing environment. However, they have
been necessary but riot sufficient to explain the economic performance of industrial
6 The value of total exports In 1993 was 3.5 times of that in 1987; excluding crude oil this ratio was 2.5. Hence, the
export growth was not only based on natural resources.SOE in Vietnam. Without adequate timing and sequencing of reforms, favourable
conditions are likely to have remained ineffective.
2.2 General reform measures
Like China, Vietnam introduced its first liberalisation measures early enough in the late
seventies. Reforms began with "experiments" on a regional basis which were only
implemented nationwide where this was deemed successful. Hence, the reform process
appeared highly ad hoc with considerable stop and go periods (Vo Nhan Tri, 1990).
Since 1987, however, Vietnam carried out a comprehensive economic reform program
(Diehl, 1993), the sequencing of which followed a relatively clear pattern:
First, direct government controls over most of the SOE were removed in 1988. In
principle, decisions on inputs, investment and production now fall in the scope of the
SOE management, and directors have greater autonomy over their work-force. In
addition, the codification of business laws (property laws, contract laws, bankruptcy law
etc.; see FLR, 1993) since 1988 was meant to provide equal opportunities for the
hitherto discriminated private enterprise sector. Whereas the legal framework for private
enterprises has been completed in 1991, SOE, however, are still subject to special
directives and decrees. The "law on state enterprises" which is designed to minimise
discretionary power of government authorities is expected to pass the national
assembly in 1995. Moreover, it is not clear whether legal claims both against SOE and
private enterprises, e.g. under the bankruptcy law, are actually enforceable.
Second, foreign investment in Vietnam was admitted in 1988. In the first years, the
expansion of some industries hasbeen directly influenced by state priority investment in
joint ventures with foreign firms. Since 1993, however, private enterprises are allowed to
form joint ventures with foreign firms (Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam as of
(December 1992; in: FLR, 1993). Parallel to FDI liberalisation, the external trade regime
has been gradually liberalised and the unified exchange rate became rather flexible in
early 1989. Exports have increased and shifted from CMEA to neighbouring Asian
Countries. Few manufacturing branches (e.g. garment, footwear, motor vehicles) still
enjoy significant import protection through tariffs (Vietnam Ministry of Trade, 1992,
1994) arid even temporary import quotas (IMF, 1993). It is reported, however, that
import competition in general has increased significantly, especially on consumer goods
markets, since trade restrictions were widely by-passed by informal trading (ADB,
1993).Third, almost all domestic prices were liberalised in 1989, and only a few "sensitive"
prices (e.g. electricity/house rents, transport tariffs) remained administered. The
government announced the abolishment of all subsidies, but this measure was
postponed until 1991 (IMF, 1994). Since that time, state enterprises are also subject to
the same tax rates (turnover tax, profit tax, import duties etc.) as the private sector,
while before they were obliged to transfer total profits to the public budget in exchange
of receiving investment funds. Most decisions of SOE managers are no longer based on
financial support from the public budget. It remains unclear, however, to which extent
investment decisions of SOE are still influenced by the government.
Fourth, high inflation that had prevailed at three-digit-levels since 1985 stopped in early
1989 and returned to only moderate levels in the following years. At first sight this was
the result of a restrictive credit policy for both SOE and non-state' enterprises, since
bank credits to the enterprise sector declined relative to national income. However,
credits to the public budget rose which was only possible in a non-inflationary way
because private savings were increasingly channelled into banks signalling high
credibility of the reforms. Hence, the state sector probably did not pass through a credit
crunch
7 whereas the share of the private sector in total bank credits increased
significantly only since 1992. Moreover, the structure of interest rates is still
administered by the government and hence subject to discriminatory policy (IMF, 1994),
since the financial markets in Vietnam are still dominated by four large state-owned
banks. Further improvements in financial markets efficiency can be expected from the
growing non-state banking sector.
Fifth, the labour market has been liberalised and is now subject only to the labour law.
The same is not true for the real estate market, since land is still under public ownership
according to the Vietnamese constitution. Since 1993, however, property rights can be
rented from the state and mortgages on land and buildings are permitted (Land Law as
of July 1993; in: FLR, 1993).
In summary, the Vietnamese reform program can be characterised as a shock-type
stabilisation combined with a broad liberalisation of goods and factor markets although
the reform of SOE and the import liberalisation have oniy been implemented gradually.
Hence, competitive forces have begun to work within the Vietnamese manufacturing
7 The additional financial flows to the public budget were probably reimbursed to SOE. The analysis of the public
budget development in Vietnam, however, is seriously hampered by insufficient functional disaggregation and by
a large unexplained residual in all published statistics, including World Bank reports.industry, but there is still room left for the influence of central and provincial government
policies.
2.3 Reorganisation of state-owned enterprises
The adopted reform measures discussed so far have created a competitive
environment, but the industrial SOE are not yet fully exposed to market forces, partly
due to conflicting objectives of government authorities. SOE still operate under the
control of a wide range of central government ministries as well as local and district
authorities. Line ministries and provincial authorities play an active role as owner of
SOE while at the same time regulating the industry in which the enterprises compete.
This has led to a discrimination of the private sector, e.g. with respect to import quotas,
trade licenses or bank credits. However, a proposal for the establishment of a special
department of the Ministry of Finance to exercise the rights of the state as owner of
SOE (financial monitoring, election of managers etc.) is still under consideration. The
Vietnamese government prefers a gradual restructuring of SOE. The reform agenda
includes a complete economic evaluation of the remaining SOE, a debt consolidation,
pilot privatisation projects and the formation of larger enterprise units.
First, according to a government decree from November 1991 all state-owned
enterprises had to apply for re-registration until September 1994 to continue operating
legally. The State Planning Committee is responsible for evaluating proposals and
deciding which enterprises are able to survive without further assistance. At the end of
1993 approximately 7,000 enterprises have been re-registered compared with more
than 12,000 existing in 1990, 2,000 have been liquidated and 3,000 have been merged
with other enterprises (Mallon, 1994). Moreover, it is reported that the number of loss-
making SOE declined significantly (EIU, 1/1995), suggesting that bankruptcy rules have
been enforced. In the manufacturing sector, more than 2,200 SOE remained in 1992
from about 3,000 in 1988. The majority of the existing industrial SOE is still of small or
medium scale, while the 260 SOE with more than 500 employees each accounted for
66 per cent of total output and 56 per cent of total employment in state manufacturing
industry (Table 3). Hence, SOE reform in Vietnam can be expected to proceed relatively
fast since the privatisation of smaller SOE is not as difficult as the reorganisation of
large enterprises.Table 3 - Output, capital and employment of manufacturing

































































Source: General Statistical Office (1994b).
Second, a special Debt Resolution Committee was set up in 1991 to clear interfirm
arrears and to settle all debts with the banking system. SOE that have already been
liquidated left approximately 1.7 trillion Dong (or 5 per cent of Vietnam's GDP) of non-
recoverable debts, the interfirm part of which has been passed to the Ministry of
Finance (World Bank, 1994b). However, the bad debts of existing SOE are probably
much higher and the problem of improving the financial status of state-owned banks is
still to be solved. From this it follows that privatisation and divestiture activities should be
accelerated since a delay bears the risk of a banking crisis a la Chile in the seventies.
Third, according to a government decision from June 1992 on "experiments to convert
state enterprises to shareholding companies" 19 profitable SOE of small or medium
size, mostly in the manufacturing sector, were designated to issue transferable equity
shares to both employees and other persons. It is reported that the state should retain
at least 20 per cent of shares (Mallon, 1994). By the end of 1993, only two enterprises
had completed the process of equitisation and six others had finished the evaluation (cf.
Nguyen Van Tuong, in: Institute for Economic Research', 1994). The main reason for
this delay is the strong resistance of the respective workers.
Fourth, the prime minister promulgated a decision in March 1994 "on pilot work to
establish enterprise groups". The stated objective of forming such conglomerates is to
rationalise SOE supervision and to facilitate the termination of line ministry and local10
authority control over SOE.
8 Each enterprise group must have at least seven members
with a total legal capital of at least 1 trillion Dong (90 million US-$). Although the
decision emphasized the need to ensure that this does not lead to the development of
monopolies, the development in several "strategic industries" (e.g. steel, cement)
already points to a weakening of competition.
Summing up, the privatisation of large SOE has been delayed whereas thousands of
small SOE were dissolved. The financial evaluation of the remaining SOE and the
settlement of their debt, resembling the German "Treuhandanstalf'-approach, signal the
beginning of a market oriented SOE reform which remains incomplete, however, as long
as property rights still belong to the government. In addition, the attempts to form larger
enterprise units are probably meant to reduce competition on domestic markets which
would require new import restrictions to become effective.
2.4 Real adjustment of manufacturing SOE
Following the 1988 reforms the manufacturing industry passed through a relatively
moderate adjustment recession, but recovered in 1991-93. A detailed analysis of how
industries adjusted to the changed economic environment reveals large differences
across industries and types of ownership, which leads to presumptions about the
.remaining government-induced distortions.
On average, the 1989-90 output fall in the manufacturing sector was slightly larger for
SOE than for non-state enterprises, but in 1991-93 SOE recovered much faster than
non-state enterprises (Table 4). Hence, the aggregate share of SOE in manufactured
output increased in the nineties in contrast to what happened in the pre-reform period.
The layoffs until 1992 in the non-state sector were of the same size as in the state
sector (about one fourth of the 1988 level; Table 5). Both facts seem to be in contrast to
the expected result of stronger competition from the private sector since the beginning
of the economic transformation. A detailed analysis, however, provides an explanation.
First, a disaggregation of sectors by ownership reveals that the performance of SOE,
both in terms of output and employment, was in general better the higher their initial
market share in that industry was (Tables 4, 5). The output growth of SOE in 1988-93
was below that of the non-state sector in some large sectors (especially food processing
and manufacturing of wood, paper, glass and ceramic) accounting for 57 per cent of
manufacturing output in 1989 (Table 2). However, these relative losses of SOE were
8 See Jemeck, 1995, on the role of enterprise unions in the pre-reform era.11
compensated by large market share gains in the chemical industry, construction
materials industry and the manufacturing of textiles, clothing and leather. This possibly
implies the existence of significant barriers to entry in these industries both for foreign
and domestic private enterprises, either due to import protection or due to sunk costs.
Table 4 - Manufactured






































aTotal industry excl. electricity and mining. -
machinery, other metal products.
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Alternatively, historically determined productivity advantages of SOE, especially from
their previously unrestricted access to capital markets, are another possible explanation
for this pattern. A comparison of output growth rates and productivity gaps between
state and non-state sector, however, reveals no clear pattern (Table 6). For example,
the large productivity lead of SOE
9 in the food processing industry (8:1) in 1989 did not
lead to a better output performance, neither did a small productivity lead in metallurgy
(1.4:1) and engineering branches (1.2:1). This shows that products and related
9 Calculated as ratio of gross output per worker in SOE and in the non-state sector. In 1989, this ratio was 4:1 as
average for the manufacturing industries; cf. Table 6, columns 3 and 4. However, the use of gross output data
may lead to a substantial bias in favour of SOE if their material input Intensity Is higher, but value added data are
not available by ownership. In addition, productivity within the non-state sector differed widely by ownership; cf.
Table A3.12
Table 5 - Manufacturing


























































aTotal industry excl. electricity and mining. - ^Corrected for classification changes in 1992;
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Table 6 - Productivity and output in manufacturing
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technologies within one industry (e.g. construction materials) are differing so widely that
capital intensive SOE (e.g. cement) and labour intensive non-state enterprises (e.g.
handmade bricks) are actually not competing in the same market. That is, the
disaggregation of manufacturing is probably not fine enough to give a sensible
interpretation of the productivity gaps. However, neither the hypothesis that entry
barriers do exist for private enterprises in some industries, nor the counterhypothesis
that historically determined productivity differences cause the difference between SOE
and non-state enterprises could be rejected.
Second, structural change took place within the state sector and the non-state sector.
Locally managed SOE have been hit hardest by the adjustment recession, whereas
centrally managed SOE recorded positive output growth in all four years since 1989
(Table 7). This leads to the presumption that the weak fiscal situation of the local
authorities did not allow the payment of subsidies to locally managed SOE to continue.
Table 7 - Output and employment in manufacturing































































slectricity and mining. -
 bln constant prices of 1982 (1988-89) and 1989 (1989-92).
Source: General Statistical Office (1992b; 1994b); own calculations.
Moreover, the weak performance of the non-state sector was mainly the result of the
collapse of cooperatives, which either went bankrupt or were converted into a private
firm. Production in handicraft cooperatives, that still accounted for 20 per cent of gross
manufactured output in 1989, decreased by about three forth between 1989 and 1992.
The formation of new private enterprises and new self-employment ("household
enterprises") apparently could only replace the cooperatives' output but not compensate
for all the jobs lost. However, the extraordinary high output growth rates of private firms14
are to be interpreted carefully since many of those are only re-labelled cooperatives but
not newly established firms.
Summing up, it has been shown that some industries have expanded while others
declined which under full employment conditions would indicate high factor mobility.
Since many industries in Vietnam have been working well below capacity, this
conclusion does not hold in general; however, some industries hired additional labour
since 1988. The share of SOE in the manufacturing sector has increased since 1988
due to the extraordinary demand pull for some capital intensive industries. Many
cooperatives and locally managed SOE were dissolved, whereas the privatisation of
large centrally managed SOE makes only little progress. The remaining discrimination
of private enterprises apparently has been reduced since 1991, so that the private
sector can be expected to accelerate growth in the next years.
3. Real adjustment of manufacturing SOE: Microeconomic evidence
The analysis in the previous section has shown that many industrial SOE have come
under pressure in the transformation process. It has also led to the presumption that the
government is still using discretionary policy measures to cushion the impact of
increased competition. This leads to the question how industrial SOE in Vietnam
adjusted to the changes in economic environment and whether they still enjoy privileged
treatment from the government. In general, the adjustment could have been the result
of flexible managers reacting to market signals or of the execution of governmental
decrees. Microeconomic evidence, gained from interviews or standard questionnaires,
can be used to provide preliminary insight into actual behaviour of managers. This
approach has two advantages over the analysis of centrally collected data: First, many
economic data are not yet published on a regular and comprehensive basis (and
sometimes not even collected by the statistical office). This applies to data on prices,
wages, output or value added at current prices
1
0 and the present value of productive
assets. In addition, valuable qualitative information can be gained by directly
interviewing the managers on their perceptions, objective functions and actions.
Second, problems of inadequate disaggregation of industries in published industrial
statistics can be avoided. For example, the construction materials industry comprises
large cement plants and small brick factories, and the chemical industry supplies
pharmaceutical products, basic industrial chemicals, consumer chemicals (soap, plastic
1
0 Output values at constant prices are calculated by the General Statistical Office from the collected data on
output quantities.15
etc.) and rubber products. Third, information can be corroborated (or rejected) by
contrasting answers from government representatives on different levels with answers
from managers. The microeconomic approach has two major disadvantages, however:
first, there is a sample selection bias, since managers of already dissolved enterprises
have not been interviewed, and second, counterfactual evidence cannot be gauged as
managers do not address hypothetical scenarios. Moreover, in a developing country like
Vietnam that introduced economic transformation processes only recently, technical
terms from western economics are to be avoided since they are sometimes adopted in
a bewildering way (see Fforde, 1991, for examples).
3.1 Results of previous studies
According to Vietnamese policy advisors many surveys of the industrial sector of
Vietnam have been conducted with different objectives since 1990, both by Vietnamese
and foreign teams, but only few of them have already been published (1-31 ).
1
1
McCarty (1993) and Beresford (1993) conducted interviews with managers, government
officials and academic researchers in summer 1991 and the first quarter of 1992,
respectively. McCarty tried to find out how autonomous SOE directors actually were and
which biases and discriminations remained. He found that the emerging private sector
and the initiative of SOE managers were encouraged although budget constraints for
SOE continued to be soft. Moreover, he feared that production monopolies and rent-
seeking activity by bureaucratic intermediaries could become more prevalent.
Beresford found that "passivity" of managers, e.g. the unwillingness to change output
prices or to collect of information about alternative sources of supply, together with
remaining administrative control over managers' decisions has been responsible for the
slow adjustment of SOE. Moreover, she argued that the attitudes in SOE towards
competition are still formed by the socialist attitude which is closer to concerted
alliances or even cartels rather than to competition.
A large survey of ILO in cooperation with the Vietnam Ministry of Labour and Social
Affairs (Ronnas, 1992) covered about 1,000 enterprises in selected provinces, both
rural and urban, in Northern and Southern Vietnam. The written questionnaire was
collected in June 1991. The objective was to analyse the economic characteristics of
and remaining obstacles for small and medium enterprises (less than 50 employees) of
all ownership types. The survey concluded that local authorities play a benevolent but
1
1 "I-XX" is the abrevlation for "Interview No. XX"; cf. appendix for a complete list of interview partners.16
rather.passive role in the establishment of new enterprises, and that shortage of capital
and "too much competition" are the most frequently cited constraints on the enterprise.
The first survey of Department for Economic Geography, University of Hannover, and
Central Institute for Economic Management, Hanoi (Revilla Diez, 1995) covered about
400 enterprises of all ownership types in three provinces. The written questionnaire was
collected in late 1992, and some 70 interviews with managers and officials were carried
out. This survey focusses on locational factors, regional and international linkages and
the judgement of managers on the economic reform. Another major finding of this
survey has been that the Vietnamese economy is highly fragmented in regional
markets.
3.2 Method of own field research
Our .information has been obtained through interviews
1
2 with enterprise managers and
representatives of federal ministries, local administrations (people's committees) and
banks during a field trip to Northern Vietnam in October 1994. Three German scholars,
including the author, have carried out the interviews, assisted by two Vietnamese
experts and one interpreter. The main objectives were 1) to identify obstacles to the real
adjustment of enterprises, 2) to identify remaining government interventions, and 3) to
assess the capability of the management to act under market economy conditions. The
third aspect deals especially with the question, whether and how the management of a
SOE that has come under pressure initiated product or process innovations.
Asan introduction, every enterprise was asked to give a brief overview of its history.
Thereafter, the interviews covered the following topics: production, employment,
investment, corporate finance, competition on domestic markets, locational factors and
foreign economic relations. Typical questions were:
What happened to this enterprise in the 1989/90 recession (output, employment)?
Who is now finally responsible for decisions related to production and investment?
What are the capital sources of this enterprise (bank credits, budget contribution etc.)?
How fierce is the competition on domestic markets and who are the main competitors?
> • -: .
For some enterprises supplementary Information was provided by detailed questionnaires from a larger survey,
undertaken by the Central Institute of Economic Management (Hanoi) in August/September 1994. The
evaluation of the complete survey, covering about 400 enterprises in three provinces in Northern Vietnam, is
going to be published separately (Kurths et al., 1995).17
What are the rates for public utilities (incl. land use rights) for this enterprise?
Has this firm any economic relations (imports, exports, FDI) with foreign partners?
Although interviews followed general guidelines, interviewers were free to pursue topics
of special interest or importance for the firm. Thus, inevitably the information from the
interviews is uneven in depth and coverage depending on the enterprise, the managers
who were interviewed and the interviewers.
3.3 Stylised facts from interviews
Preliminary answers to the questions above were gained directly from the interviews.
Due to several ambiguities, these answers have been supplemented and contrasted
with background information from newspaper reports etc. Without claiming for
representativeness, the range of answers, additional information and some unresolved
ambiguities will be presented in the following.
3.3.1 Production and management
In the interviews, first the recent development of the firm and the perceived competition
was inquired. The main interest was to get information about the firm's performance but
also about managerial attitudes during the transformation process. In the critical year
1989, some interviewed SOE produced virtually nothing and workers were sent home.
Provincial authorities confirmed that they couldn't support the locally managed SOE in
these years (in contrast to centrally managed SOE). For a short time period, laid off
workers received a compensation from so called "social funds", i.e. enterprise reserves
earmarked for periods of underemployment. Hence, budget constraints seemed to have
been hardened significantly.
Most enterprises were well informed about important price relations and about domestic
and foreign competitors. However, due to transport problems national markets
remained regionally segmented. Competition from China is often ignored or
downgraded because of the perceived low quality. In two "strategic" sectors (cement,
steel) national conglomerates have already been formed with the target to achieve
national autarky by the year 2000. At the same time they are authorised to control the
respective imports. Moreover, cross-subsidisation of weak SOE seems to be a motive
for forming enterprise groups. Various interview partners regarded South Korean
conglomerates ("chaebols") as a shining example for these groups. This is a
development to be monitored carefully.18
Managers are in most cases qualified technicians rather than accountants. In many
cases, however, managers already were able to optimise the production capacity and
adopt marketing strategies. Even a former public servant was among the interviewed
managers of private firms; one of his most valuable assets is a large workshop which he
was able to rent due to his contacts to ministries. Both in SOE and private enterprises
there do exist capable entrepreneurs, but we also met SOE directors who complained
about the missing guidance from the state planning authorities.
3.3.2 Licensing requirements
In the second section it was asked for problems in the licensing process, since "red
tape" in this stage is reportedly one of the major stumbling blocks for new firms. The
obligatory re-registratidn was apparently no problem for the interviewed SOE. Some
private entrepreneurs still remained in the legal form of a cooperative, since they feared
problems with the licensing requirements for a shareholding company. Probably, this
behaviour has also advantages due to different tax rates. In the past, many private firms
were pressed to register as cooperatives for ideological reasons. Most of these
cooperatives were re-privatized immediately after the legal basis for private enterprises
was established in 1988 (decree) and 1990 (law), respectively. Apparently, there is
room for ad-hoc decisions of local administrations but problems with too strict licensing
requirements are probably overstated.
3.3.3 Taxation
In the third section it was asked for the types and rates of taxes to be paid. One reason
was simply to get information about the managers' knowledge about the tax system, but
in addition answers to these questions can shed some light on the perceived injustices.
All enterprises were aware of their tax duties, but the crucial point of course is correct
accounting. This question could not be dealt with directly in the interviews. However,
some interview partners from SOE regarded the current tax system more like a
disadvantage for SOE since tax authorities do not check private enterprises as careful
as SOE. De jure there are no differences in the taxation of private enterprises and of
SOE..For SOE, a "capital tax" is levied on 70 per cent of the 1990 capital stock as a
substitute for charging interest on previous budgetary contributions. The justification for
this tax is obvious (interest surrogate), but was rarely understood by SOE managers.19
3.3.4 Locational factors
The fourth section dealt with the state of infrastructure and public utilities, since
according to press reports insufficient electricity supply and poor road conditions are
among the greatest obstacles. All enterprises mentioned temporary blackouts, but none
of the interview partners complained about his own situation. The only exception was
the national steel corporation which is still located at a traditional location off the main
transport net. Most firms had to order special transport enterprises for their final
products, and the delivery time was in general regarded as sufficient. Moreover, the
rates for electricity, water and transport services charged from private enterprises
showed in general no differences as compared to SOE. In summary, locational
constraints were often not regarded as really troublesome, probably since everyone is
affected. However, locations along the coast are obviously more attractive due to better
export links.
3.3.5 Land use rights
In the fifth section it was asked for the property rights (conditions and price) of the firm's
real estate and for public land zoning plans. Land is still in public ownership and has to
be rented from the state. In practice, build-up area or farmland can be used only after
paying the former owner of the building or the peasant. Many interviewed private firms
often depended on SOE which rented their idle real estate at excessive rates compared
to what the state charges from the SOE. Hence, some firms preferred building a new
workshop to renting from other firms. Office rents in the larger cities have already
reached the level of Hong Kong, but the construction boom will in the medium run lead
to an easing. Some interview partners feared that Vietnamese firms could be pushed
out of the cities.
Since all towns in the densely populated river deltas are surrounded by arable land
zoning is a difficult task, especially if the local authority wants to declare new industrial
zones in the outskirts but also to satisfy the growing demand for new flats. All industrial
zones are subject to permission from the (federal) Ministry of Construction; this
procedure has delayed the declaration of new areas. The provincial planning agencies
regarded this procedure as extreme obstacle for autonomous regional development.
Hence, one of the greatest assets of SOE is their real estate, which is often in attractive
city locations. Secondary markets for land use rights are already existing so that:20
excessive rents will soon erode. The central problem, however, is adequate land
zoning.
3.3.6 Employment
In this section it was asked for the amount and structure of labour remuneration and for
the situation of qualified workers. Average wages were about 30 US-$ p.m. (which is
also the minimum wage for foreign enterprises) and more, but many firms, especially
SOE, paid more than the official minimum wage. Moreover, only SOE are obliged to pay
a single compensation for laid off workers (about 70 per cent of the last salary) from the
SOE's own "social fund", a substitute for a social security system.
Qualified labour comes from technical schools or is. trained by the enterprise staff, and
is in ample supply. In some cases, up to 80 US-$ p.m. was paid for qualified labour
which is still below the minimum wages in neighbouring countries (Riedel, 1993).
However, this gap is expected to be closed fast with new investment, although average
labour productivity is presently relatively low.
Obviously, labour markets are relatively flexible and wages are paid according to the
respective financial situation of the firm. However, the consequences of the recently
passed Labour Law are unknown yet.
3.3.7 Corporate finance
In this section it was asked for the amount and conditions of external finance. There is
virtually no published statistical information on this subject, neither from the banking
sector nor from enterprise surveys. Reportedly, external finance is the major constraint
for new firms, together with land use rights.
All SOE are charged a "capital tax" on the funds they received from the budget before
1989 (about 0.4 per cent p.m.). Some SOE still receive investment funds directly from
the budget, for which they have to pay interest below the normal bank lending rate.
Many SOE get investment credits from the state-owned Industrial Development Bank at
a reduced rate (0.6-0.7 per cent p.m. as compared to normal rates of 1.8-2.2 per cent
p.m.); none of the private enterprises could apply for such a credit. While the standard
interest rate is relatively high in real terms, the various preferential rates are close to the
actual inflation rate. Those SOE which are producing as subcontractors for foreign firms
borrowed funds from their foreign partner with a credit guarantee from VIETCOM bank.
Moreover, bank credits in foreign currency were diverted from the respective foreign21
bank to the VIETCOM bank, which then disbursed the money to the enterprise at a
higher interest rate (cf. also World Bank 1994a).
In general, mortgages on buildings are possible, but small private enterprises usually
rent the building so they cannot apply for a credit. In that case, funds are reportedly
borrowed from friends or from private money lenders. Although the amount of such
informal credits rarely exceeded US$ 100 at a very high interest rate,, these credits are
important for most of the newly established private firms.
Privileged access to bank credits is now a common way in Vietnam to further support
SOE, but this will change if state banks have to compete with an expanding private
banking sector. Moreover, informal financial markets will play a role as long as the
requirements for a bank credit are deterrent for a small enterprise.
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3.3.8 Foreign trade and FDI
In this section it was asked for the way how newly established enterprises can carry on
international trade. According to a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Trade, any
"suitable" enterprise can get an import-export license. However, dubious licensing
procedures and the lack of export credits prevented free access of private trading
companies. De jure, the conditions are such that licenses are only given to large firms
which are mainly trading own products. However, we found some industrial SOE that
were engaged in wholesale trading. Moreover, it is reported that some SOE under the
control of the Ministry of Defence are involved in smuggling import goods. Conversely,
many private enterprises complained that they have to order special foreign, trade
agencies which charge them high commissions.
Some state enterprises compete quite successfully in foreign markets (e.g. machinery in
Thailand). Others asked for higher protection against foreign suppliers; one director
even protested against "unfair" pricing of Korean tool exporters. Although the
Vietnamese steel industry is reportedly still inefficient (and hence prices of domestic
steel products exceed world market prices by far) this seemed to be quite unreasonable
to us. By contrast, in some industries the competition from domestic firms was regarded
as tighter than that from foreign suppliers, e.g. for pharmaceutical products, which are
allegedly copied with low quality standards in Vietnam.
Until recently, FDI was only attracted by SOE; after the recent change in legislation this
is expected to change rapidly. In addition to formal joint ventures there are widespread
examples of licensing and subcontracting. In any case, Vietnamese entrepreneurs often22
reported to feel discriminated by the current practice of foreign partners not to accept a
"Made in Vietnam" label on their products.
/
4, The role of market signals versus government directives: Evidence
from six case studies
The selection of six case study firms from the sample of 24 firms interviewed was based
on several criteria. First, extensive and reliable information was a prerequisite. Second,
the selected enterprises should present variety with respect to industry, size, level of
government administration and economic performance since the beginning of reforms.
There was a preference not to consider firms from "dinosaur industries" (e.g. steel mills,
cement) and from too heterogeneous industries (e.g. chemical industry, manufacturing
of other metal products). Information was obtained ^through in-depth interviews with
enterprise management and supervising ministries as well as with other concerned
institutions as banks and planning departments in October 1994. Although it was not
planned to undertake a longitudinal study, information from interviews undertaken in
1992 (Revilla Diez, 1993) could be used for some enterprises. In addition, follow-up
interviews are envisaged for subsequent visits within the next years.
4.1 Seafood processing
The general characteristics of this industry are large capital needs for freezing plants.
The first company (1-18) is an old SOE under local administration. About 450 workers
(plus seasonal workers) are presently employed. The company began exporting to
Japan already in 1982. In the beginning, exports were launched via a state trading
agency, but since 1989 the company is exporting directly. Interestingly enough, the
company is allowed to import motorbikes and fertilizers which are meant to support the
subcontractors. Given strict import regulations for motorbikes, this is an enormous
privilege of the company. In addition, the import licensing procedure seems to be
arbitrary. The equipment (ice production, generators, freezing plants) has been bought
step by step since 1986 from Japan, while the Vietnamese government guaranteed for
the foreign credits. According to the director, this company could sell seafood well
above the actual capacity.
The second company (I-27) is a private limited company which has been established in
1993. Until presently, the company is only exporting seafood that has been bought from
subcontractors, but a new shop area has just been finished and freezing plants have23
already been bought. The equity capital stems from a large bequest and from relatives
in Canada. In addition, a large bank credit at commercial rates has been raised with the
assistance of the People's Committee. This statement caused considerable obscurity
since the local administrations are not allowed to officially guarantee bank credits.
Probably, the People's Committee representative effectively supported the company
with moral suasion towards the bank, which contradicts all prejudices since the
company is a private enterprise.
The comparison shows that newcomers face two problems: the extraordinary high
capital costs for normal bank credits and the disadvantage of being restricted to narrow
external trade options. Given the booming export demand in East Asia for foodstuff and
seafood in particular, however, the risks of newcomers are relatively low.
4.2 Shoes
The general characteristics of the industry are its labour intensity and export orientation.
The first company (1-8) has been established in 1980. At that time it produced only parts
of leather shoes for exports to the Soviet Union and employed more than 300 workers.
In 1989, this production line ended due to the CMEA dissolution. Most of the workers
were laid off virtually over night. Since then, the management has tried to establish new
products, but the production of slippers and handbags for the domestic market could not
compensate for the losses incurred. For climatic reasons, leather shoes are regarded
as inadequate for the domestic market. In 1993, the manager was replaced and the
company was incorporated into a large leather manufacture from South Vietnam. Since
then, the company gets financial and technical assistance from the parent company for
its reorganisation. By the time of interviews, the shops were almost empty, but new
machines from France were reported to be installed to manufacture shoes for exports.
The second company (1-17) has been established in 1929 as carpet manufacture. Since
1977 the company was a large conglomerate of 5 SOE plus 20 cooperatives which are
acting as subcontractors. In the 1990s, more than 50 per cent of the 10,000 workers
(1989) were laid off, mainly from the cooperatives. The reason was the termination of
trade protocols with CMEA countries which were the sole customers until 1989. Since
then, the management has successfully tried to establish new export markets (Europe)
and to improve the quality of the carpets which are still hand-woven. The company has
got its own import-export-license so that marketing falls under its own responsibility
which is again an enormous privilege. In addition, new lines of production (garment,24
sport shoes) have been established in the company which are already accounting for
half of the total revenues. One crucial advantage of the company was the abundant
shop area in an own multi-storey concrete construction, which allowed the installation of
a modern assembly line for sport shoes. These shoes are produced under license from
a South Korean company which also offered an investment credit with preferential
conditions. By contrast, the quality improvement for carpets has been made possible by
loans under official development aid from Sweden. In both cases, the state-owned
VIETCOM Bank has guaranteed the foreign credits.
The example of the two companies shows how light industry was seriously affected by
the termination of CMEA trade. However, there are obviously large differences even for
quite similar production lines. Since qualified labour is not a^serious bottleneck,
differences in the workforce cannot be the reason; differences in real estate and access
to capital, apart from other locational advantages matter instead.
4.3 Electrical machinery
The general characteristics of the industry are its relative human capital intensity.
The first company (1-6) has been established in 1980 as a Vietnamese-Hungarian joint
venture for electromotors. Most of the blueprints are developed within the company, and
these have been quite successful in other Asian markets. The manager claimed not
having received any support from the government since 1989 whereas other companies
have been subsidised persistently. However, the company has received a R&D grant
from the Ministry for Science and Environment. The company has streamlined its
production lines in 1990-92 so that unit costs have been reduced significantly and
output has already recovered. Clients are now largely non-SOE including foreign
companies in Vietnam, whereas they have been almost exclusively SOE until 1989.
According to the manager, "equitisation"
1
3 would be a good solution for the company,
but the Ministry of Finance has reportedly fixed too high a price for the shares. By
contrast, he doesn't like cooperating in a joint venture with an European multinational.
Our impression was that this rejection was only due to a general aversion against power
sharing rather than to economic reasons.
The second company (I-9) has been converted in 1955 from a private enterprise to a
locally managed SOE. The equipment has come mostly from Russia, with a 1960's
In Vietnam this is a vague concept of selling shares, in which only a limited amount can be bought by the general
public, whereas the larger part rests with the responsible line ministry and the workforce.25
vintage. In 1988, still about 1,000 workers were employed. Although the output in 1989
was literally zero, the management was reluctant to lay off all workers in order not to
loose qualified technicians. At that time, the company has invested in modern
equipment without using any bank credit and is now exporting machinery to Thailand.
Goods are not exported directly by the company, but via an enterprise union that
charges relatively high rates.
The third company (I-30) has been established in 1977 as three partite enterprise union
which has later been merged into one centrally managed SOE. Most of the products
have been designed for the special needs of the coal mining area nearby. Hence, the
recession in the mining sector seriously affected the company's output. The manager,
however, complained about the lack of administrative orders and long term guidelines
for the company. Moreover, he assessed import competition to be strong. His complaint,
however, does not seem to be well-based, given the current tariff structure through
which his products are effectively protected.
It is wellknown that the human capital endowment in Vietnam is sizeable, especially due
to numerous engineering students in the former CMEA. The case studies show that
qualified labour is flexible enough to adjust to the new economic environment and that
the large initial recession of the engineering industry did not ultimately impede the
upswing as can be seen e.g. from the booming electrical industry. What would be useful
to strengthen this industry is to broaden the base for domestic research and
development in Vietnam. FDI may play a role in this respect but it is also the
reorganisation and stabilisation of (presently state owned) colleges, laboratories and
consultant services, which may help to create a growth momentum for some relatively
human capital intensive industries.
5. Conclusions
The analysis of published industrial statistics has led to the presumption that market
signals have played a large role for the structural change within the manufacturing
sector. It has been shown that the relative success of SOE has been caused by the
general collapse of cooperatives on the one hand and the large success of some SOE
dominated industries on the other hand. Since the remaining discrimination of private
enterprises has been reduced only since 1992, the expansion of the private sector was
curbed for some years. The evaluation of the ongoing SOE reform has shown that
thousands of small SOE were dissolved but at the same time the privatisation of large26
SOE has been delayed. The financial evaluation of the remaining SOE and the ongoing
debt settlement, however, are promising signs for a consistent market oriented SOE
reform.
Initial conditions that are most advantageous for SOE are the historical allocation of
land and buildings that can be used for own expansions and for renting to other firms,
and the cheap financial funds received in the past. The interviews and survey data
provided anecdotal evidence that the government still protects SOE, especially through
preferential credits and selective licensing for international trade which provides access
to capital goods imports. However, many SOE have come under heavy pressure on
domestic goods market, since budget constraints have been hardened persistently
since 1991. By contrast, the lack of external finance and limited direct access to world
markets are probably the most serious obstacles for non-state enterprises, whereas
locational factors are in general not very impeding.
Many directors of SOE have adjusted quickly to market conditions and are actively
supporting the privatisation of SOE. The evaluation of interviews and case studies
suggests that process innovations are mainly introduced by joint ventures with foreign
investors, whereas product innovations, even into completely different industries, are
typical for Vietnamese nationals. Both findings are in contrast to earlier findings that
emphasized sluggish management behaviour, especially in Northern Vietnam, and
continued soft budget constraints. In the same vein, foreign investors have'favoured
SOE as partners not due to government directives, but because of their favourable
initial conditions, especially ownership of real estate and trade licenses. Hence, the
counter hypothesis is supported that industrial SOE behaved almost like private
enterprises and still profit from favourable initial conditions.27
































































Raymond Mallon (UNDP State Enterprise Reform Program)
Vietnam Steel Corporation, Hanoi
Thanh Son Mechanics Plastic Cooperative, Hanoi
Central Pharmaceutical Factory No. 1, Hanoi
private enterprise for metal furniture, Hanoi
Vietnam-Hungary Electrical Motors (VIHEM), Dong Ann
Zenner-COMA Water Meter JV, Hanoi
Hanoi Leather Shoes Factory
Haiphong Machinery Manufacturing
PC of Haiphong, Economic Department
Toan Thang aluminium cooperative, Haiphong
PC of Haiphong, Industrial Department
Haiphong EPZ administration board
Haiphong Cement Company
carton manufacturing, Haiphong
Haiphong Electronics Company (HAPELEC)
Hang Kenh Carpet Corporation, Haiphong
Haiphong Seaproducts Processing Company
State Bank of Vietnam, Haiphong branch
Vietnam Maritime Commercial Stock Bank, Haiphong
Bach Dang Shipyard, Haiphong
Hong Gai Garment Company
Hong Gai Brewery
PC of Quang Ninh, Industrial Department
private car repair, Hong Gai
private shipyard, Hong Gai
Hoa Huong Sea Product Company, Hong Gai
leather shoes cooperative, Hong Gai
Bank for Investment and Development, Quang Ninh branch


























Le Dang Doanh (CIEM)
National Institute for Urban and Rural Planning, Hanoi
Ministry of Light Industry, International Cooperation Department
State Committee for Co-operation and Investment
Ministry of Foreign Trade
State Bank of Vietnam, Credit Department y
Ministry of Finance, Budget Department
Ministry of Heavy Industry
Ministry of Energy
Bac Do company, Hanoi
PC of Hanoi, Foreign Economic Relations Department
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 bDue to classification changes 1992 figures for private sector are not fully comparable with
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